What makes Barcelona such a formidable team? - Part 2

Continuing on from part 1...

6. Lack of counterattacks

A particularly interesting feature of Barcelona’s attacking play is how often they turn down quick counterattacking opportunities from within their own half. If possession is regained inside the opposition half they will of course look to exploit the space (which ties in to the pressing game as will be discussed later), but box-to-box counters are a rare sight.

Rather than speed up the play on such occasions, Barcelona look to use the opportunity to regain shape and restart their patient passing game. This gives the opposition time to get men back behind the ball, and perpetuates a constant state of Barcelona being camped in their opponent’s half. With so many men back, the opposition have no out-ball and this enables Barcelona to suffocate them inside their own half. In addition, it avoids the game descending into an open, end-to-end battle where Barcelona may be susceptible to counter-counterattacks. (As was the case when Barcelona tried to force a quick goal in the last 10 minutes of their away match vs Arsenal this season).

A potential problem with this strategy is that by compressing all the play into the final 3rd of the pitch, Barcelona are effectively also shutting off their own space too. Normally this would be a hindrance to a passing side – Arsenal fans know all too well how frustrating it is to see a team knocking the ball harmlessly from side to side in front of a 9-man defence. But Barcelona are perhaps the best side in the world at functioning in tight spaces. Notice how many of the following team goals are scored by cutting though 8/9-man defences, especially from 2:20 – 4:15):

7. Tactical flexibility

Barcelona are often accused of lacking a plan B, but this ignores the fact that the plan A itself is versatile and allows for several different formations which take advantage of different areas of the pitch.

4-3-3 – Barcelona’s standard formation features 3 midfielders to control possession, a false 9 in the shape of Messi and 2 wide forwards making out-to-in runs.

3-4-3 v.1 – With Busquets dropping back in between Pique and Puyol, this allows the team to break free of aggressive pressing of the centre backs by opposition forwards. The fullbacks can then push on and provide width higher up the pitch, allowing the three forwards to narrow and link up with each other at close quarters.

3-4-3 v.2 – When Alves pushes forward on the right flank, Pique and Puyol shuttle over to the right, with Abidal tucking in off the left to become in effect a third centre back. The front three can again narrow, with Iniesta providing a more cut-inside wide threat on the left.

Diamond 4-4-2 – Against teams that look to match Barcelona’s trio in midfield, Messi can drop off to play as a no.10 on a more full-time basis. The opposition can either pull a man back to deal with him (freeing up space for one of Xavi or Iniesta), or ignore him and allow him space in between the lines to wreak havoc.

This versatility gives them a great advantage – they can shift easily between different shapes at any stage of the game, without having to waste any substitutions.

8. Dual-function players

Perhaps one of the greatest difficulties in replicating Barcelona’s system is that they have a couple of phenomenal players in Lionel Messi and Dani Alves who can essentially play in two positions at once.

Dani Alves is on paper a full-back, yet his incredible pace and stamina allows him to patrol a whole right flank by himself. You could say that his presence is like having an extra man, allowing Barcelona to play a 4-4-3 formation. Note how much of the pitch he covers in the heatmap below – almost the entire length and half the width:

In the attacking phase he’s one of the most potent wingers in the world (recording 12 goals and 48 assists in his last 3 seasons), in the defensive phase an aggressive presser. During opposition transitions, he can be seen hurtling back towards his own goal, making some fantastic last ditch tackles in the process (granted he does also get caught out on occasions, such is the risk of the role he plays): 

Although he was already a brilliant individual artist and an intelligent teamplayer, Lionel Messi’s redeployment to the “false 9” role mid-way through the 2009/2010 season allowed him and Barcelona to reach even greater heights. It was a tactical masterstroke from Pep Guardiola, who managed to find a way to make his side even more possession-orientated without losing any of the attacking potency that they’d had the previous season with Eto’o in the centre forward role.

The value of a false 9 usually lies in their ability to drop deep and link-up with the midfield, utilising good passing and ball control skills to control the ball tidily and maintain the flow of the attack. The theory is that centre backs – not being comfortable marking empty space – will advance forward and close down the false 9, creating space in behind for one of the wide forwards to run into. (Good example here)

The problem with such a tactic is that it relies on intelligent movement by the wide forwards, and the assumption that the centre backs will close down. If this doesn’t happen, the team can be left with no presence inside the box and no penetration.

However, this isn’t a problem with Lionel Messi in the false 9 role. He has the complete skillset as an attacking player, combining superb dribbling, passing and shooting into one devastating package. He can drop back into midfield and help to build attacks from deep, but his ability to accelerate and to dribble past players with ease means he’s never too far away from goal to not be a threat. He can poach goals; he can slalom his way through to goal; he can score from range; and he can provide defence-splitting passes. In the last 2 seasons, he has scored 15 goals from outside the box in open play, and provided 36 assists for teammates - wherever he is in the opposition half, he’s a threat.

9. Pressing

As well as being the best attacking side in Europe, Barcelona are probably also the strongest defensively. What they lack in conventional 18 yard box defending, they more than make up for with their aggressive pressing game higher up the pitch, stifling opposition attacks before they have a chance to come to fruition.

Barcelona’s pressing game is aided by several factors:

(a) They dominate possession high up the pitch, forcing the opposition to get men back behind the ball. With their opponents penned back inside their own half and lacking an outlet for pressure, Barcelona can often close in for the kill and either win the ball back quickly or force an aimless long ball which the defenders can sweep up easily.

(b) The majority of their passes tend to be short, so Barcelona’s players are nearly always in a position to press once play breaks down, as Johan Cruijff explains:

"Do you know how Barcelona win the ball back so quickly? It's because they don't have to run back more than 10 metres as they never pass the ball more than 10 metres."

(c) They conserve energy while in possession, enabling them to expend more while pressing. It’s often thought that Barcelona work harder than the average team, but their distance covered figures from this year’s Champions League are quite revealing. On average they covered 110.465 km per game, compared to 110.644 km by 2nd-placed Man Utd. This was less than the 112.040 km average of all teams in the competition. Barcelona’s season-high distance covered was 116.624 km, which was dwarfed by the overall competition high of 124.503 km. Clearly, the long periods spent playing a relatively low-intensity passing game help to balance out the high-intensity pressing.

So how does the pressing game actually work? Work rate is obviously one factor, but intelligence and organisation are very important too. It’s telling that Barcelona’s defensive record has improved with each passing season under Guardiola, as players have gained more experience and take up better positions while pressing:

2008/2009 – 35 league goals conceded, 55 conceded in 62 games overall
2009/2010 – 24 league goals conceded, 40 conceded in 59 games overall
2010/2011 – 21 league goals conceded, 38 conceded in 62 games overall

Barcelona have several different systems of pressing which they employ depending on which area of the pitch the ball is at.

When an opposition keeper or defender has the ball, one player (usually Villa or Pedro) will sprint at him and force him into rushing a pass, while the players behind him employ a system of through marking to cover all the nearby passing options. If they do it correctly, then the player should have no choice but to punt it long, allowing Barcelona’s defenders to read the flight of the ball and move in to intercept.

At 0:57 in the following video you can see this type of pressing in action. Pause it at exactly 1:09 and you will see that all 6 white shirts are being marked by nearby Barcelona players – the ball is hit long and possession is regained:

If you also skip to 2:00 in the video above, you can see a different type of pressing in action. When an opposition player has the ball close to the flank, Barcelona players will attempt to surround and outnumber him, suffocating him and stealing the ball. At the exact moment possession is stolen (around 2:12), Barcelona have 3 players ganging up on just 1 Real player.

A more dynamic type of pressing can be seen in the opening 30 seconds of the following video. With Espanyol passing quickly from point to point, Barcelona players have to take it in turns to close down the man on the ball (usually the one nearest by), with players from behind coming in to replace the previous marking duties of the presser:

Immediately after losing possession in the final third, the Barcelona players in close vicinity – no matter whether they’re a defender or attacker – will attempt to close down and win it back quickly (as can be seen in this video of the Arsenal-Barcelona tie at the Emirates last year). This form of pressing is perhaps the most aggressive, and least organised. Opponents who can bypass this first wave of pressure stand a chance of launching a successful counter.

10. Universality

One of the key concepts that underpins Barcelona’s positional fluidity is that every player should be comfortable operating in any part of the pitch, and contributing to the 3 main aspects of Barcelona’s game – defence, possession, and attack.

It’s not uncommon for instance to see Xavi dropping back to become the deepest outfield player on the pitch, popping up on the right flank, or advancing to the centre forward role when Messi drops deep.

Here’s a clip of Javier Mascherano dribbling into the opposition area from centre back (while Xavi takes over his position):

Here’s Pique scoring a goal from a marauding run forward:

Dani Alves making a trademark poacher-like run to score a header:

And best of all, the forward trio of Messi-Villa-Pedro defending like rabid dogs:

In Summary

Barcelona’s playing style owes a lot to the above principles, but without long-term grassroots investment it’s not possible for any single club to build a collection of footballers with the required technical skills to implement such a gameplan.

Team chemistry plays a big part too, and Barcelona’s core group of players have that in abundance. The likes of Xavi-Iniesta, Messi-Alves, and Pique-Puyol have had years (helped by a lack of rotation) to build up their understanding of each other’s movement and passing patterns, such that it has become second nature.

It’s likely that we may not see another Barcelona in our lifetime, so we should savour every moment of the current one while they’re still around.

Credit to allas4 for majority of videos.

What makes Barcelona such a formidable team? - Part 1

On Saturday night Barcelona beat Manchester United comfortably to secure their third Champions League victory in just 6 years, and their second under Pep Guardiola. The manner of the victory – against undoubtedly their biggest European rivals over the last 5 years – has left many in no doubt that this is a special team up there with the best in history. Even the traditionally insular English media had to hold their hands up and admit that Barcelona’s blueprint was the way forward, after seeing their nation’s top club humbled on home soil.

While Frank Rijkaard’s 2004-06 team was itself an excellent unit, Guardiola has taken dominance to a whole new level with a brand of suffocating possession football that has earned admirers around the world. Incredibly, his side has managed more than 50% possession in each of his 183 games in charge. You have to go all the way back to May 2008 to find a game where Barcelona were outpassed (a 1-4 loss away to Real Madrid in the league).

Barcelona have the ability to remain at the top for a few years yet, and in the meantime a lot of clubs must be wondering how they can catch up and compete toe-to-toe with the Spanish champions. With largely the same group of core players that existed during the Rijkaard era, Guardiola has transformed Barcelona into an almost-unbeatable side. Clearly, his impact on the team’s strategy and mentality has been a large contributing factor behind their success (contrary to claims that anyone could do a similar job managing such a group of talented players).

Aside from the obvious technical qualities such as touch, ball control, passing and awareness which are taught from a young age at La Masia, what makes Barcelona’s system such a force? Here are 10 points which I believe to be key:

1. Patience

One of the most fundamental aspects of Barcelona’s play is a calm, methodical approach to build-up play. By moving the ball around the pitch and changing the angle of attack, the ball is eventually worked into the space just outside the 18 yard box, and gaps will develop as impetuous opposition defenders attempt to close down.

It sounds simple but with 90,000 fans urging you on to get forward, especially when you’re chasing the game, it can be difficult to stick to your principles. However that’s what Barcelona do best, and here are two examples of their patience paying off:

2. Technical defenders

A common tactic used to prevent a team playing the ball out from the back is to close down the centre backs with through marking employed to cover the players immediately to the front and side. With no options and limited time on the ball, they are forced to hit it long, but not at Barcelona. Their holding midfielder, centre backs and even goalkeeper can dribble out of tight spots, enabling the team to stick to their building-from-the-back principle.

It’s not just enough that the defenders be able to break away from pressure, they also need to be able to take advantage of the resulting space. Gerard Pique in particular is adept at advancing into the midfield zone and playing accurate passes, including raking cross-field balls. See 0:44 in the following video:

3. Defensive pivots

One of the novel aspects of Barcelona’s play is the use of the keeper and holding midfielder as outlets for pressure. Victor Valdes is an excellent passer by goalkeeper standards, and takes advantage of his deep positioning to receive the ball from one fullback/centre back and switch it to the other:

Note his role in initiating Pedro’s goal in the following clip (skip to 10:30):

Sergio Busquets does a similar job in midfield, sitting behind the Xavi-Iniesta pairing and redirecting passes from one to the other. A tidy player, his one-touch play stands out in particular. Notice how often he redistributes play from left to right and vice versa in the following clip (starts at 0:59):

A great example of this one-touch play can be seen in his pass to Keita leading up to the following goal. It may seem a simple pass, but it gave Keita just a little bit more time and space to advance forward and link up with Messi:

4. Lack of crosses

Aside from the fact that the tallest member of the Barcelona frontline measures less than 6 feet, the fullbacks generally don’t look to play high balls into the box because it’s quite simply a highly inefficient strategy. Crossing is a low percentage game which relies on a fair amount of chance, and as such it doesn’t fit in with the Barcelona mantra of possession, possession, possession.

Instead, the width of the pitch is used intelligently to draw out opposition fullbacks and stretch the backline horizontally, with the ball then being circulated back into the middle to take advantage of the channels that have developed between the defenders – as can be seen here (1st goal):

...or indeed to set up a shot from the edge of the box:

And again here (1st goal):

5. Set pieces

For Barcelona, set pieces are usually an extension of their open play passing game. Of course, with the likes of Pique, Puyol and Busquets in their line-up they have aerial prowess and are not afraid to take advantage of it from time to time, but by and large they prefer to play it short and keep possession high up the pitch.

An interesting feature of Guardiola’s reign has been the increased usage of rehearsed set plays, with the side taking advantage of the 10 yard rule and often creating 3 vs 2 situations from corners.

Here are several examples of beautiful team moves and goals resulting from corners (you can ignore the Spain footage if you want...):

Free-kicks are also a source of innovation:

Credit to allas4 for the majority of the videos. Part 2 can be found here.

Stoke 3-1 Arsenal: Chalkboards

For the 3rd time in four visits to Stoke since 2008, Arsenal have ended up on the losing side and yet again after going behind to an early set piece goal. Here are a few interesting chalkboards courtesy of the Guardian.

Clearances

Stoke were quicker to the second ball throughout, recovering possession with 27 of their 38 clearances (71%). The home team were constantly able to break out of danger zones, and consequently Arsenal were unable to exert extended pressure on Stoke's backline.

Arsenal on the other hand only managed 10 successful clearances out of 26 (38%). This proved costly when Walters scored Stoke's 3rd to kill the game off, pouncing on a poor clearance from Djourou before any Arsenal defender could react.

Interceptions

Stoke's interception chalkboard sums up their defensive strategy well. They were quick to get men back behind the ball (Arsenal's tempo also played a part), defending their 18 yard line well and looking to block Arsenal's passing lanes through the middle. Overall they made 20 interceptions to Arsenal's 12. Only 1 of them was in Arsenal's half, though it proved vital - Pennant latched onto Ramsey's lazy backpass and exploited the space in between the lines to fire in Stoke's second.

Stoke's passing

As with most opposition sides, Stoke targetted Arsenal's left flank, which was even weaker than usual due to Clichy's absence. Kieran Gibbs had an average game, and for Stoke's 3rd goal he failed to deal with a diagonal ball out wide, allowing Stoke to build an attack down that side and score.

See 0:45 in the following video: (credit to Arsenalist)

                      stok2131h68 by arsenalist

Laurent Koscielny

In general Koscielny has been a very good performer this season, forming a good understanding with Djourou and doing an excellent job in closing down opposition attackers early.

When playing a high line his value cannot be questioned, but when forced to defend inside his own 18 yard box he has displayed a certain level of vulnerability. His natural game is to win the ball early, getting tight and  nicking the ball away with an out-stretched leg, but inside the box this approach is something of a liability. Therefore, when defending deep he has at times been reckless, trying to win the ball at all costs and leaving gaps/conceding several penalties in the process. At other times he's been unsure of himself, wary of conceding fouls but not understanding some of the positional requirements of defending deep/soaking up opposition pressure.

This flaw to his game was evident again during Stoke's 3rd goal (skip to 0:50 in the above video), where he chased the ball out of the box and in the process ended up leaving a gap for Walters to exploit a couple of seconds later (granted it was a poor clearance from Djourou).

2nd half substitutions

At the start of the 2nd half, Wenger threw on Bendtner and Chamakh, giving Arsenal a very attacking 4-4-2 shape with Bendtner coming in off the left. Van Persie dropped deeper and Chamakh assumed the centre forward role, looking to play with his back to goal as usual. The Morroccan completed 26 out of 29 passes, and won 3 out of 4 tackles, adding a different dimension to Arsenal's attack.

This gave van Persie much more freedom than he had in the first half (where he only recorded 1 shot). After the break he managed to fire away 4 shots, 3 of them on target (including the goal) - all straight down the middle.

Chamakh was vital in creating space for van Persie. His tendency to drop deep, control it neatly (the Morroccan has a great touch, which is often overlooked) and lay the ball off quickly - drawing a marker towards him in the process - was very useful, and led to 2 great chances for the Dutchman, one of them a goal.

The first was on 73 minutes - Chamakh controlled the ball well from a goal kick, drew Stoke's right back out, and laid it off to Wilshere. Wilshere spotted the gap in behind Wilkinson and threaded the ball into the space for Bendtner, creating a golden chance for van Persie which was saved at point-blank range. See the following video:

                      stokrvpchance467 by arsenalist

The goal (see first video) was a culmination of the effect of the 3 Arsenal substitutes. Rosicky - twisting, turning and probing as usual - played a good forward pass between the lines. Chamakh, with his back to goal and drawing the attentions of Wilkinson, flicked the ball quickly to van Persie. Bendtner made a run to the left, dragging a centre back with him and giving van Persie enough room to fire away his 6th right-footed goal of the season.

Unfortunately the comeback was short-lived, but the one positive that can be taken out of this game (as with the 2-2 draw against West Brom and 2-1 win over Everton) is that a modified, attacking 4-4-2 is a decent plan B.

Who should start as centre forward in Van Persie's absence?

Source: Press Association Images

So once again Robin van Persie is out injured at a crucial period during Arsenal's season. His absence means that progression through to the Champions League quarter finals will be an uphill struggle, and in the FA Cup a daunting game at Old Trafford awaits the Gunners should they advance past Leyton Orient in their 5th round replay tonight. On the positive side he will only miss 2 Premier League games should his recovery go to plan, with Arsene Wenger estimating that the Dutchman will be out for at least 3 weeks.

Robin van Persie is of course a top class player, but his effect on Arsenal's system extends far beyond his own individual contributions. His appreciation for space, intelligence in his movement, and ability to retain and distribute the ball high up the pitch, all make him the ideal candidate to act as the "false 9" within Arsenal's attack. His presence brings the best out of the likes of Cesc Fabregas and Theo Walcott, players who thrive on the space that van Persie creates for them in behind defences.

Van Persie's injury last year saw Arsenal transform from free-scoring high-fliers to a team that ended up limping, trophyless, over the finishing line in May. It was clear that his injury disrupted the team's attacking flow, and although Wenger experimented with several different players in the centre forward roles (Bendtner, Eduardo, and more radically Arshavin), none of them were able to replicate the influence of the Dutchman.

With Wenger looking unlikely to stray from his 4-2-3-1 setup this season, it's important that whoever fills in for van Persie is as similar as possible in terms of style of play. Step forward Marouane Chamakh. The Morroccan was signed on a free from Bordeaux last summer, and although he's struggled for form since December (not surprising given his lack of starts since the return of van Persie), his performances in the first few months of the season were excellent. Although lacking the creative talent and individual goalscoring game of van Persie, Chamakh was an effective deputy because vitally, he was able to replicate the intelligent movement and the hold-up play of the Dutchman, which is so vital in dragging markers out of position and facilitating the other attacking players in breaking into space.

The following table shows the overall team's attacking performance as well as individual goals/assists stats of the players who have started as centre forward since Arsenal switched to a 4-3-3/4-2-3-1 at the start of last season*. Realistically Arshavin will not be playing in the middle again this season, but his stats are shown for reference.


(*Only Premier League and Champions League proper games have been included, as other competitions tend to include weakened teams. Further breakdown of home/away performances as well as game-by-game stats are available by clicking on the other tabs at the bottom.)

What's evident is that the team scores at an amazing rate with van Persie as starting centre forward (obviously), but despite appearing to be individually the weakest of the club's 3 centre forwards, Chamakh does a much better job than Bendtner in preserving the attacking flow and goal average. The Morroccan lacks movement into goalscoring positions, directness, and killer instinct, but he more than makes up for it with his teamplay and overall positive effect on the team's ability to ripple the back of the net.


Source: Getty Images

I have speculated previously on the reason behind Bendtner's apparent negative effect on team performance despite seeming to do well on an individual level. I believe that the role of the centre forward in Arsenal's 4-2-3-1 should first and foremost be to aid the flow of the attack and to create space for the 3/4 players behind him. The individual goalscoring/assists performance of the centre forward comes secondary to the team's overall attacking performance. In that respect, van Persie and Chamakh do a far better job than Bendtner, who seems to stifle the team's fluidity with his (relatively) poor touch and movement. This trend is evidenced by the superior team performances when the centre forward role was occupied last season by Andrei Arshavin. The Russian, a natural attacking midfielder, contributed next to nothing in terms of goals/assists but enabled the team to score at an average of 2 goals per game, highlighting the importance of having a player who can drift about, take passes in his stride and keep the ball moving within the final 3rd.

One of the arguments in favour of Bendtner is that he very often pops up with vital goals and assists (this was particularly true from February onwards last season). However, you could say that Bendtner's ability to provide important match-saving contributions is a self-fulfilling prophecy. By making the system less geared towards fluidity and interchanging of positions, and more geared towards serving an orthodox no.9 (relative to other Arsenal centre forwards), the team's goal output is decreased, but the likelihood of Bendtner being the one to score or assist increases. And therefore he appears to be bailing Arsenal out, when in fact his presence was probably the root cause of Arsenal struggling in the first place.

In fact, the only game where Arsenal have scored more than 3 team goals with Bendtner as starting centre forward, was the 5-0 win over Porto. Bendtner was surprisingly clinical that game, netting a hattrick from 2 predatory finishes and a penalty. A system with Nicklas Bendtner as the single centre forward would only work in the long term if he could improve his finishing. In a more orthodox attacking system, less chances are created, and it therefore becomes vital that the focal point inside the box (i.e. Bendtner) makes the most of the chances that come his way. Unfortunately this has rarely been the case in the past.

Conclusion:

Unless Wenger switches to a 4-4-2 or another formation that facilitates 2 centre forwards, Marouane Chamakh remains the ideal candidate to take over van Persie's false 9 role. The Morroccan was given his chance at the start of the year and proved that he was able to fill the void that would otherwise have cost Arsenal a chance at the title, as it did the previous season. Nicklas Bendtner remains a decent plan B, but Chamakh's qualities are more in tune in with Arsenal's plan A.

Mid-season analysis: What's wrong with Arsenal's central defence?

We're exactly half way through the Premier League season and after another 2 cheap points were dropped at Wigan recently, it's worth exploring what's going wrong at the heart of Arsenal's defence, especially when it's occupied by the French pair of Laurent Koscielny and Sebastian Squillaci. The goalkeeper and left back situations have been scrutinised in great detail by Arsenal fans but the purpose of this article will be to examine the centre backs alone through a combination of statistical and video analysis.

For the sake of a fair comparison, Champions League and League Cup games will be ignored due to the weakened nature of the teams fielded. Tackles and interceptions made by centre backs in the final 3rd of the pitch will be excluded from the stats as these generally only occur during corner kick situations and do not reflect defensive ability. The 3rd goal conceded against West Brom in the 2-3 home defeat will also be ignored as the team was playing a 3-man defence from the 66th minute onwards (tackles/interceptions/shots during that time will also be ignored).

Partnerships

Firstly, let's take a look at the defensive efficiency of the 5 different centre backs pairings that have been fielded during the Premier League campaign so far:

Table 1: Centre back statistics for all 19 Premier League games to date

The Djourou-Koscielny and Song-Vermaelen partnerships have had little game time so can be ignored from this comparison. With that in mind the key points are that:

-The Koscielny-Squillaci pairing is the leakiest and concedes goals at almost 4 times the rate of the most secure pairing, Djourou-Squillaci.

-Despite conceding the least goals, the Djourou-Squillaci partnership actually concedes the most total shots and the 2nd most shots on target.

-The Koscielny-Squillaci partnership concedes fewer total shots than any other partnership, but the most shots on target.

-The Koscielny-Vermaelen pairing concedes the fewest total shots and the fewest shots on target.

These stats are for all Premier League games and so do not take into account the differences between home games and away games (where defences generally come under extra attacking pressure). Therefore here is a further breakdown of these stats beginning with home games:



Table 2: Centre back statistics for all 9 Premier League home games to date



From this table the only 2 partnerships worth comparing are Djourou-Squillaci and Koscielny-Squillaci. Again, key points are that:

-The Djourou-Squillaci pairing is the most secure and concedes goals at almost 3 times a lower rate than Koscielny-Squillaci.

-The Djourou-Squillaci partnership concedes more total shots and more shots on target than Koscielny-Squillaci.

And finally the away performances:



Table 3: Centre back statistics for all 10 Premier League away games to date



Key points here are that:

-Djourou-Squillaci once again emerges as the most secure pairing, despite conceding the most total shots.

-Koscielny-Squillaci is the least secure and concedes the most shots on target (as opposed to the least in home performances).

-Koscielny-Vermaelen concedes the least total shots and the least shots on target.

With the exception of shots on target conceded by Koscielny-Squillaci, the pattern of home and away games is quite similar.

Individuals

So what is the reason behind these trends? To understand we need to take a closer look at the strengths and weaknesses of each individual centre back, so that we can recognise the dynamics of each separate pairing. Here are individual stats for interceptions, aerial duels and tackling:



Table 4: Individual defensive stats for the 4 centre backs



The points we can draw from this are that:

-Koscielny is the most pro-active defender, attempting the most tackles and aerial duels, and the 2nd most interceptions. His tackling is by far the tidiest.

-Squillaci prefers to keep his position rather than close down, attempting fewer interceptions, aerial duels and tackles.

-Vermaelen and Djourou are somewhere in between these 2 varying styles, Vermaelen tending more towards Koscielny's game while Djourou is more akin to Squillaci.

-Despite attempting the most aerial duels, Koscielny is joint weakest in this area along with Squillaci (who attempts by far the fewest).

-Vermaelen is the strongest in the air, with Djourou not far behind.

Conclusion:

With this knowledge, we can roughly rank the centre backs in 2 important areas of the game:

Closing down:

Koscielny = Vermaelen > Djourou = Squillaci

Aerial ability:

Vermaelen > Djourou > Koscielny = Squillaci

This helps us to better understand the dynamics of each centre back pairing:

-Koscielny-Vermaelen concedes the fewest shots on target because it closes down the best and thwarts attacks before they develop (with a larger sample size it could possibly rank the lowest in terms of total shots too).

-The Djourou-Squillaci partnership concedes the most total shots because it doesn't close down (it is joint worst for shots on target too).

-The Koscielny-Squillaci pairing is the leakiest because it is weak in the air and therefore vulnerable from aerial balls and set pieces.

-The Djourou-Squillaci pairing is the strongest because it is deep-lying and doesn't risk being caught high up the pitch. Instead it looks to soak up opposition pressure, taking advantage of Djourou's aerial ability.

The major anomaly within these stats is that the Koscielny-Squillaci partnership concedes few total shots (due mainly to Koscielny's closing down?) but concedes the most shots on target and indeed the most goals (by a large distance). If the partnership restricts opposition shots so much, why then do a high proportion of these end up on target and in the net?

Comparing the Squillaci-Djourou and Squillaci-Koscielny partnerships, it's difficult to comprehend that the vast difference in defensive efficiency is down to a simple difference in defensive strategy. The fact that replacing Johan Djourou with Laurent Koscielny results in an almost 4-fold increase in goals being conceded, should be cause for concern, and points the finger of blame at the young Frenchman.

So what exactly is Koscielny doing wrong? It could be that he struggles on the left side of defence when partnered with Squillaci, as opposed to the more natural right-sided role he assumes when partnered with Vermaelen. Another factor may be that without the comfort of a Premier League-experienced partner, Koscielny lacks the right support and leadership to effectively function within this defence.

Another more simple explanation would be that Laurent Koscielny is simply error-prone, and that despite all his good work in getting tight to opponents and winning the ball back early, he lets it all go to waste with one or two moments of madness each match, whether it's a positional or technical error.

As usual, this pattern is best demonstrated with actual graphic evidence from the matches. The following video breaks down the 21 goals conceded in the Premier League campaign so far (excluding the 3rd against West Brom), and we can observe that indeed the main problems of the Squillaci-Koscielny partnership are its aerial weakness and Koscielny's tendency to make costly mistakes:

Solution:

So what can be done to remedy the current situation? The obvious decision would be to drop Koscielny in the short term and persist with the Squillaci-Djourou partnership, certainly in away games anyway. At home Koscielny's style of play would be beneficial towards Arsenal's pressing game and he can compete with Squillaci to partner the excellent Djourou (and when fit, Vermaelen).

In the long term, with more Premier League and general defensive experience, Koscielny should mature into a fine modern centre back, combining his excellent technical qualities and intelligence with improved concentration and reliability. It will be of great interest to see which two of Djourou, Koscielny and Vermaelen will establish themselves as the club's first choice centre backs given their similar ages and differing qualities.

Arsenal 3-1 Chelsea - Wenger gets his tactics spot on

After 13 failed attempts, Arsenal have finally beaten a Chelsea side containing Didier Drogba. Arsene Wenger spoke about the threat posed by the Ivorian before the game, and refreshingly his team selection was geared as much towards nullifying Chelsea as it was towards aiding Arsenal's passing game.

Wenger had several big selection decisions to make and he got all of them spot on:
-Johan Djourou came in for Sebastian Squillaci, adding more physical and aerial presence against Drogba

-A fully-fit Robin van Persie was preferred to Marouane Chamakh and resumed his role as a false 9

-Theo Walcott started on the right to reduce Ashley Cole's influence and provide a threat in behind Chelsea's defence

-Samir Nasri's work rate and economy in possession was preferred on the left with the more lackadaisical Andrey Arshavin dropped to the bench



Arsenal's 4-2-3-1: Song (17) and Wilshere (19) sat behind the front four, covering the right and left flanks respectively.
Van Persie (hidden behind 2) played his usual false 9 role, dropping back into midfield & creating space for Fabregas (4) and Walcott (14) to advance into the box. Koscielny (6) brought the ball out of defence while Djourou (20) stayed back.



In the same fixture last year, Ashley Cole set up two goals from left wing crosses and repeated the feat again at Stamford Bridge this season when he set up Didier Drogba for the opener. In both games Nasri started ahead of Walcott on the right, and the latter goal arose as a direct result of Nasri failing to track Cole's run down the left. Walcott played in the return fixture at Stamford Bridge last season and managed to keep Cole reasonably quiet, so perhaps Wenger had this in mind when deciding to start the young Englishman on the right.

In theory it makes a lot of sense, Walcott has tremendous pace and his diagonal running in behind opposition defences is a major threat - one which requires left backs to play more conservatively. This was the case in the game last night, with Cole barely venturing into the final 3rd of the pitch. Not only did Walcott pin back Cole for the majority of the time he was on the pitch, he also displayed excellent defensive awareness in tracking the runs of the left back (and of Malouda) on the few occasions that space did develop on Chelsea's left side - as this following video shows:



Ashley Cole's passing chalkboard: In the 73 minutes that Walcott was on the pitch, Ashley Cole managed just one (unsuccessful) pass in the attacking 3rd.

Walcott will have got a lot of plaudits for his role in Arsenal's 2nd and 3rd goals but his defensive work was equally excellent. With Cole/Malouda on the left and Ferreira/Kalou on the right, it's clear which side was Chelsea's strongest, and indeed there was a clear passing bias to the left throughout the match.  Walcott's defensive diligence - along with Bakary Sagna and Alex Song's excellent performances - helped to shut down Chelsea's entire left flank.

Arsenal's right-sided dominance: Alex Song (6/6) and Bakary Sagna (5/5)
completed all of their attempted tackles.

Chelsea's left flank shut down: Despite showing a clear preference for passing to the left flank, Chelsea were unable to penetrate into the final 3rd on that side - amazingly not a single pass was played from that zone. They had better luck down the right against the defensively-weaker trio of Clichy-Wilshere-Nasri, but Kalou and Ferreira lacked the ability to take advantage, and their teammates didn't seem to have much faith in them.

Not only did Arsenal defend well in their own half, they also pressed well in Chelsea's. Up until the 3rd goal, Chelsea's keeper and centre backs were put under constant pressure by the closing down of van Persie and Fabregas (and occasionally the 2 wider players), with the fullbacks and deeper midfielders pushing up to close down the gaps in behind. This was a much more co-ordinated form of pressing than has been seen in recent weeks from this Arsenal side, and it paid dividends. Chelsea were unable to build from the back and resorted to numerous long balls forward, which the Arsenal back 4 dealt with fairly comfortably. In addition, Arsenal were able to win back possession several times inside Chelsea's own half, the most prominent example being Walcott's robbing of Malouda in the build-up to Arsenal's 3rd goal.

While the defending was excellent, there was still the small matter of breaking through Chelsea's deep-lying defence. It's been a problem area for Arsenal in recent encounters between the two sides, with Chelsea keeping clean sheets in each of the previous 3 games. But this time it was to be different. In an attempt to break down stubborn defences, Wenger has given Alex Song more license to get forward this season (facilitated by a change in the midfield set-up from a 1-2 to more of a 2-1). The decision paid off against West Ham, and it did again yesterday as the Cameroonian started off an attack from deep, driving into the box before calmly shooting into the far left corner of the net.

In fact, Wenger will have been delighted with all 3 goals yesterday because they were a perfect demonstration of his attacking philosophy, and of the capabilities of Arsenal's 4-2-3-1/4-3-3 formation:

Overall, a very positive performance for the Gunners. Not only does it keep them in touch with the league leaders, it also provides a tactical blueprint with which to approach future big games. One of my main criticisms of Wenger has been that, while he may be an expert technician, he is not necessarily an expert tactician. On last night's evidence I am beginning to believe he may also be the latter.

Arsenal 1-0 West Ham: Analysis of Arsene's new-look midfield

For the 2nd Premier League game running, Arsene Wenger chose to field a Denilson-Song-Fabregas midfield three but unlike the City game last weekend, Arsenal had to make do with playing against the 11 men of West Ham in a fixture that has been quite tight and low-scoring in recent years.

As such, this was the first true test of this new midfield's ability to break down a deep-lying defensive team. A similar system was in place against Partizan with Denilson the deepest midfielder and Song more box-to-box, but on that occasion Jack Wilshere played as the attacking midfielder in place of the injured Cesc Fabregas. Wilshere was of course suspended for this fixture and the one at Eastlands, had he been available it's likely we may not have seen this novel midfield system in place.



Arsenal's midfield setup vs West Ham: Denilson (yellow) held, Fabregas (blue) attacked and Song (green) alternated in between. It should be noted though that Denilson was subbed off after 67 mins, after which Arsenal set up camp in the final 3rd. The average positions of Fabregas and Song may therefore appear to be higher up than they actually were while all 3 players were on the pitch together.



With Denilson holding the midfield and Fabregas supporting Chamakh in attack, Song was free to roam in between and contribute to both defence and attack. Much like Yaya Toure, Song is a player valued for his physical and defensive qualities but with the technical ability and intelligence to play higher up the pitch in a more direct and creative role. Potentially he's the best box-to-box player in the squad given his all-round abilities, intelligence and discipline (although Wilshere has also impressed so far this season), but the problem for Arsenal is that he's also by far the best holder. The question is which is better - Song holding/Denilson passing or Denilson holding/Song box-to-box? Wenger has opted for the latter in the last few games they've played together. Song brings added dynamism to the attack compared to Denilson, but at the same time still gets back to form a double defensive shield when the opposition have the ball in Arsenal's own half, so his re-deployment further forward may not necessarily weaken the defence.

Although each of the midfield trio had individual roles, there was considerable interchange with all 3 being comfortable playing deep or closer to the opposition box (Denilson less so). This seems to be a conscious decision by Arsene Wenger in an attempt to find new ways of breaking down the dreaded "parked bus" which has often been the scourge of this possession-based Arsenal side. With players moving out of their natural zones, they can lose their markers, draw players away from team-mates, and arrive un-noticed in dangerous areas. In particular, if the deepest midfielder - who often has no specific marker - is given the license to get into the opposition box, then that adds a whole new attacking dimension to this Arsenal side.

Of course this requires discipline and understanding between the midfielders in order not to leave the defence uncovered, this was painfully apparent against West Brom but on Saturday this didn't seem to be a problem.

As usual, some video evidence to summarise the key features of the new-look midfield:

Arsenal 2-3 West Brom - A Comedy of Errors

Not much to say about this defeat really, for 70 mins Arsenal put on a textbook display of how to lose a football match in a game that they were really expected to win quite comfortably.

Some grim stats:

-Eboue completed 8/15 passes in 56 minutes

-3/10 of Arshavin's corners found a teammate

-Nasri completed 1 pass into the box (a corner)

-Song won 5/11 tackles

-Eboue and Rosicky attempt 0 tackles; Koscielny and Diaby lost the 2 tackles they each attempted

-Clichy lost 6/7 aerial duels

-Nasri attempted 10 shots; the next highest was Sagna with 4; Chamakh and Arshavin managed 3 apiece in 90 minutes

-West Brom had 5 shots on target during the match, they scored from 3 of them; Arsenal had 6 shots on target despite having 30% more possession

-Arsenal conceded 2 goals within the space of 3 minutes

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Sit back and admire the incompetence on display: